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REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY ACROSS LEVELS? 
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 
AND EU CONSTITUTIONALISM
Davor JanËiÊ*
Summary: This contribution analyses the meaning and practical ap-
plication of the concepts of representative democracy and constitution-
alism in relation to national parliaments within the European Union. 
A speciﬁ c focus of investigation is the post-Lisbon function of national 
parliaments as conceptualised in a variety of models of EU constitu-
tionalism. These models underline the importance of the independent 
roles of national parliaments by observing them not in the classic con-
stellation of hierarchy but rather in that of heterarchy. However, there 
is as yet no sophisticated methodological approach for assessing the 
interactions between national parliaments and EU institutions and 
there is very little evidence of national parliamentarians performing 
as European actors. In order to test the theoretical premises, the ar-
ticle delves into the political praxis and examines the manner in which 
MPs and senators apply scrutiny instruments regarding a number of 
EU dossiers that were the object of cross-level discussions within the 
frameworks of COSAC, the Barroso Initiative and the early warning 
mechanism. The objective of the inquiry is to test the hypothesis that 
national parliamentary scrutiny of EU decision making does not occur 
as an isolated domestic process but as a process that is interdepen-
dent with those unravelling at the EU level, and that such scrutiny has 
implications for the European Union’s democratic legitimacy.
1. Introduction: weaving national political actors into the EU 
decision-making playground
Twenty years after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the 
democratic basis of the European Union has a new shape. With the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the operating sys-
tem of the Union was reconﬁ gured to involve traditional constitutional 
* Assistant Professor, Institute of Constitutional and Administrative Law, Utrecht University, 
the Netherlands. This is a revised version of the paper presented in Boston, Massachusetts, 
at the 19th Conference of Europeanists organised by the Council for European Studies of 
Columbia University from 22 to 24 March 2012. The author is grateful to Professor Leonard 
Besselink, Dr Karolina Boronska-Hryniewiecka, François Randour and other participants 
on the panel for their very useful comments. The author would also like to thank two anony-
mous reviewers for their helpful and constructive remarks.
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actors that are typical of a full-blown national political community. Citi-
zens have gained the right to initiate EU legislation under certain condi-
tions and the national parliaments of the EU Member States have be-
come the centrepiece of many contemporary constitutional discussions 
in Europe.1 The ink is still wet on the so-called Fiscal Treaty,2 signed on 
2 March 2012 by all Member States except the United Kingdom and the 
Czech Republic. This Treaty, concluded outside the regular legal frame-
work for the conclusion of EU Treaties and thus within an intergovern-
mental setting,3 yet again impacts on the status of national parliaments 
in the Union’s juridico-political order.
This paper explores the EU concepts of representative democracy 
and constitutionalism in relation to the European portfolio of national 
parliaments and seeks to answer the question of whether these parlia-
ments perform their rights and duties within the EU constitutional or-
der, ie beyond the domestic conﬁ nes of their competences. Within this 
portfolio, constitutional values such as political representation and ac-
countability are key to positioning national parliaments on the Union’s 
constitutional map and interpreting the meaning of their institutional 
functions within the EU construct.
Traditionally, states are structured hierarchically. After being invest-
ed by the electorate or by the representative body, the executive branch 
typically drafts and initiates legislation and guides its passage through 
the legislature. The executive then implements it and monitors the ad-
dressees’ adherence to it. Yet with the creation of the European Union, 
a portion of domestic powers thereto exercised by national parliaments 
was delegated to EU institutions. Besides the Council of Ministers, which 
remains the decision-making powerhouse, one of these institutions is 
the EU’s own parliament - the European Parliament. The claim to law-
making authority thus became a challenge, almost an irritant causing 
disputes between the EU and its Member States, arousing national jeal-
ousies and forcing the introduction in the Treaties of the principle of sub-
sidiarity and of the means to ensure its application.4 Already long before 
the introduction in the Lisbon Treaty of the early warning mechanism 
for the monitoring of subsidiarity compliance, a cross-level institutional 
1  The citizens’ initiative is laid down in Article 11(4) TEU, whereas the competence of na-
tional parliaments is summed up in Article 12 TEU.
2  The full name of this treaty is Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union.
3  Article 16 of this Treaty provides nevertheless that at most within ﬁ ve years of its entry 
into force, the necessary steps shall be taken to incorporate the substance of this Treaty 
into the EU legal framework.
4  See Article 5(3) TEU.
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forum had been established as early as 1989 under the name of COSAC,5 
as a biannual conference gathering delegations of the European Affairs 
Committees of national parliaments and of the European Parliament. 
Furthermore, since even after the Lisbon Treaty the appointment of the 
Commission continues to be dominated by the European Council and 
the Council of Ministers rather than by the European Parliament,6 the 
idea of establishing a link between directly elected representatives of the 
Member States and the Commission became prominent as a vehicle of 
palliating the democratic deﬁ cit and was institutionalised in 2006 in the 
form of the so-called Barroso Initiative.7
After discussing the EU concept of representative democracy from 
a legal viewpoint, we analyse the relationship between national parlia-
ments and the EU as inscribed in the Lisbon and Fiscal Treaties and 
as conceptualised in the most relevant theoretical models of EU consti-
tutionalism. Thereafter, we present the existing forums of less formal 
interparliamentary cooperation across levels in the EU and, ﬁ nally, ex-
amine the practical exercise of domestic parliamentary scrutiny of EU 
legislation from a more empirical perspective. With examples from prac-
tice engendered by COSAC, the Barroso Initiative and the early warning 
mechanism, we enquire whether the functions performed by national 
parliaments within these three mechanisms could be beneﬁ cial not only 
for the national legal orders but also for that of the European Union it-
5  This is the acronym derived from the French phrase Conférence des Organes Spécialisés 
dans les Affaires Communautaires. 
6  Article 17(7) TEU reads: ‘Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament 
and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a quali-
ﬁ ed majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Com-
mission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its 
component members. If he does not obtain the required majority, the European Council, 
acting by a qualiﬁ ed majority, shall within one month propose a new candidate who shall 
be elected by the European Parliament following the same procedure. The Council, by com-
mon accord with the President-elect, shall adopt the list of the other persons whom it proposes 
for appointment as members of the Commission. They shall be selected, on the basis of the 
suggestions made by Member States, in accordance with the criteria set out in paragraph 
3, second subparagraph, and paragraph 5, second subparagraph. The President, the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the other members 
of the Commission shall be subject as a body to a vote of consent by the European Parlia-
ment. On the basis of this consent the Commission shall be appointed by the European 
Council, acting by a qualiﬁ ed majority’ (emphases added).
7  Though the importance of these links is mostly uncontested, it has been correctly ob-
served that domestic elections are ‘an extremely blunt instrument for citizens to express 
policy preferences’, because of a variety of factors, including: (a) the lack of transparency in 
Council negotiations and the consequent difﬁ culty of attaching responsibility to the partici-
pating national ministers; (b) the prevalence of domestic issues on the electoral agendas; (c) 
the fact that the most inﬂ uential political parties rarely provide voters with clear alternative 
policy options concerning major questions related to EU governance. Pippa Norris, ‘Repre-
sentation and the Democratic Deﬁ cit’ (1997) 32(2) European Journal of Political Research 
275.
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self. We assess whether such cross-level forums may open a window of 
opportunity for a more democratically ﬁ t and transparent Union.
2. Representative democracy in the EU and national parliaments: a 
legal perspective 
One novelty of the Lisbon Treaty is the assertion that ‘the function-
ing of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy’.8 While 
citizens are directly represented in the European Parliament, the Member 
States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State 
or Government and in the Council of Ministers by their governments. 
The EU founding treaties also provide that these state ofﬁ cials (presi-
dents and prime ministers) are ‘themselves democratically accountable 
to their national parliaments or to their citizens’.9 The Treaties thereby 
endorse the agency chain that links the EU level to the national level of 
governmental authority. The EU hence relies on the accountability and 
legitimation mechanisms that are ingrained in the domestic constitu-
tional orders. This testiﬁ es to a less autonomous understanding of the 
Union by the drafters of the Treaties, since the Union is not conceived 
of as the only source of public power but includes those of the Member 
States. In other words, the EU level alone cannot provide a panacea for 
all of the Union’s democratic ills.
Concomitantly, the European Parliament has grown from a body 
representing ‘the peoples of the states brought together in the Commu-
nity’10 to a body representing ‘the Union’s citizens’.11 The Union’s and the 
European Parliament’s representative claim henceforth focuses on the 
citizen rather than on the collective ‘peoples’. The national boundaries 
between each and every European people belonging to the EU family 
have been ‘erased’ and they have merged into one entity consisting of 
citizens under one roof - that of the European Union. Again, a sense of 
civic ‘togetherness’ and political unity is sought. Yet the Union’s citizens 
hold this appellation because they are citizens of one (or rarely more) of 
the Member States and, as such, they are represented in the parliament 
of that Member State. There is thus a degree of overlap between the rep-
resentative claims of the European Parliament and its counterparts in 
the Member States. This raises the question of their mutual relationship 
and cooperation, which we address under Heading 6.
8  Article 10(1) TEU (emphasis added).
9  Article 10(2) TEU.
10  Former Article 189(1) TEC.
11  Article 14(2) TEU.
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Despite the possible expectation that the enhancement of the Euro-
pean Parliament would solve the bulk of the EU’s democratic woes, it did 
not. In the eyes of Lindseth, representation by the European Parliament 
is not 
constitutional representation on par with a national parliament, in 
the sense of the European Parliament being understood as the ex-
pression of the democratic will of a political community that sees 
itself as historically cohesive and capable of self-rule through a leg-
islative body constituted for that purpose. […] In this critical respect, 
the national parliaments remain the ultimate principals in the Eu-
ropean system, while the European Parliament is fundamentally an 
agent.12 
The same view was espoused by the German Federal Constitutional 
Court (BVerfG) in its Lisbon Treaty judgment (Lissabon-Urteil), where it for-
mulated a democracy solange of sorts, placing national parliaments of the 
Member States at the throne of EU legitimacy before the European Parlia-
ment for as long as the Union is founded on the principle of conferral.13 
These sceptical views of the European Parliament’s representative quality 
laid bare not only the fact that national parliaments have a role to play as 
regards the EU but also the hypothesis that this role is to be played within 
the EU. It is well known that national parliaments perform scrutiny activi-
ties related to the EU,14 but it is much less known whether they act with 
a view to contributing to a wider EU debate that would include appraising 
the action by EU institutions as such or whether they carry out scrutiny 
merely with a view to holding the national government to account without 
paying heed to the overarching institutional context of EU decision mak-
ing. This hypothesis is put to the test under Heading 7.
Factors that led to EU constitutional solutions that incorporate do-
mestic sources of authority include the facts: (a) that the Council of Min-
12  Peter L Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State (OUP 
2010) 229 (emphasis in original).
13  Davor JanËiÊ, ‘Caveats from Karlsruhe and Berlin: Whither Democracy after Lisbon?’ 
(2010) 16(3) Columbia Journal of European Law 355; Daniel Thym, ‘In the Name of Sov-
ereign Statehood: A Critical Introduction to the Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitu-
tional Court’ (2009) 46 CML Rev 1813.
14  See the many debates thereof in: Gavin Barrett (ed), National Parliaments and the Eu-
ropean Union: The Constitutional Challenge for the Oireachtas and Other Member State Leg-
islatures (Clarus Press 2008); Philipp Kiiver (ed), National and Regional Parliaments in the 
European Constitutional Order (Europa Law Publishing 2006); Andreas Maurer and Wolf-
gang Wessels (eds), National Parliaments on Their Ways to Europe: Losers or Latecomers? 
(Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2001); John O’Brennan and Tapio Raunio (eds), National Parlia-
ments Within the Enlarged European Union: From Victims of Integration to Competitive Ac-
tors? (Routledge 2007); Olaf Tans et al (eds), National Parliaments and European Democracy: 
A Bottom-up Approach to European Constitutionalism (Europa Law Publishing 2008).
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isters is collectively unaccountable but retains pre-eminence in decision-
making processes despite its ministerial and executive structure; and 
(b) that the European Parliament not only still struggles to assert its 
legislative power but continues to possess only rudimentary powers in 
appointing the Commission President, European Council President and 
other key EU functionaries. One of these solutions was to approximate 
national parliaments to the Union’s legislative and controlling processes. 
As one author put it, ‘if the EU institutions have such difﬁ culties in mak-
ing a qualitative leap forward, why not strengthen the existing national 
basis of legitimacy’, especially given that ‘national parliaments play their 
part mainly on the executive side of representation, by providing a demo-
cratic base for their governments to act within the Council’.15 That is why 
in general terms:
When an international treaty begins to boast an integrated legal 
system conferring rights and creating duties on all public and pri-
vate persons altogether new questions of legitimacy come to the fore 
which cannot be resolved by reference to the ordinary legitimating 
mechanisms of international law.16
It is therefore critical to devise new methods of securing legitimacy 
for the European project and its future success, not least through par-
liamentary means. As the following two headings show, to achieve this 
it is necessary to turn to the Member States and their institutions for 
assistance.
3. National parliaments in the Lisbon Treaty: an insufﬁ cient 
stimulus? 
Ever since the Maastricht Treaty, through the declarations and pro-
tocols appended thereto, national parliaments have been assuming more 
independent roles within the EU. It was the rise of the principle of sub-
sidiarity that sparked the closer inclusion of national parliaments in 
European affairs.17
In the wake of the Lisbon Treaty, the most encompassing task of na-
tional parliaments is to ‘contribute actively to the good functioning of the 
15  Karlheinz Neunreither, ‘Political Representation in the European Union: A Common 
Whole, Various Wholes or Just a Hole?’ in Karlheinz Neunreither and Antje Wiener (eds), 
European Integration after Amsterdam: Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy 
(OUP 2000) 144-145.
16  Joseph HH Weiler and Joel P Trachtman ‘European Constitutionalism and its Discon-
tents’ (1996-1997) 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 356-357.
17  Berthold Rittberger, Building Europe’s Parliament: Democratic Representation Beyond the 
Nation-State (OUP 2005) 194.
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Union’,18 which itself, as we have seen, shall be based on representative 
democracy. Parliamentarians are to do so above all by policing the EU 
institutions’ respect for this principle by sending them reasoned opinions 
on incoming EU legislation that violates subsidiarity and, if necessary, 
by seizing the Court of Justice.19 Yet the practical fulﬁ lment of this task 
is fraught with difﬁ culties in dissociating subsidiarity from proportional-
ity and in achieving the high thresholds imposed by the Treaties for the 
MPs’ collective action to bear fruit. This is why Von Bogdandy referred to 
the early warning mechanism as a ‘subordinate safeguard mechanism’, 
which ‘invites national parliaments to dress up any political concern 
in the guise of a subsidiarity claim’.20 He acknowledges, however, the 
centrality of national parliaments in legitimising primary EU law. In his 
view, ‘in the current constitutional situation there is a clear dominance 
of the line of legitimacy from the national parliaments’.21 This he under-
pins by reliance on the Treaty provision that involves these parliaments 
in the ordinary treaty amendment procedures (by means of approval) 
and simpliﬁ ed treaty amendment procedures (by means of opposition).22
Given the obstacles in applying the new rights of national parliaments 
and the fact that these parliaments continue to be withdrawn from the 
European legislative process stricto sensu, one is tempted to question the 
sufﬁ ciency of EU provisions to genuinely constitute the engine of national 
parliamentary engagement in EU affairs. This state of affairs is further 
exacerbated by the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, which has led to 
the unprecedented empowerment of the executive branch. Many crucial 
decisions regarding the single currency and budgetary policy, which lie at 
the heart of national parliamentary involvement, are decided by the Heads 
of State or Government gathering in the European Council and Eurozone 
summits with ever increased frequency. This brings home the idea that 
domestic forums of democratic representation, in the ﬁ rst place national 
parliaments, ought to ﬁ nd ways of keeping the EU’s action in check, re-
gardless of the provisions foreseen in the Treaties establishing or deepen-
ing the Union. This also means that their own disempowerment ought to 
occupy the centre stage of the EU political debate. 
18  Article 12 TEU.
19  Articles 7 and 8 of Protocol no 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality. See the most recent analysis of the early warning mechanism in Philipp 
Kiiver, The Early Warning System for the Principle of Subsidiarity: Constitutional Theory and 
Empirical Reality (Routledge 2012).
20  Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast ‘The Federal Order of Competences’ in Armin von 
Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 
2010) 303-304.
21  Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles’ in Bogdandy and Bast (n 20) 50.
22  Article 48 TEU.
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4. Moving into the post-Lisbon era: the euro crisis and a further 
degradation of national parliaments? 
The Lisbon Treaty reforms notwithstanding, for national parliamen-
tarians EU matters remain an ‘alien territory’ that is not ‘theirs’.23 It 
is not astonishing, therefore, that certain authors are sceptical of the 
national parliaments’ role in European matters.24 Yet what precisely is 
‘theirs’?
The need for swift ﬁ scal consolidation in the Union, itself riven by 
the Member States’ budget deﬁ cits and rising public debts, potentially 
jeopardises the position of national parliaments. In this respect, the Eu-
ropean Council of March 2011 analysed the policies likely to address the 
EU’s ﬁ scal problems and mandated ‘full involvement of national parlia-
ments’ and ‘full respect of the prerogatives of national parliaments’.25
The resulting EU Fiscal Treaty, which is set to enter into force no 
sooner than 1 January 2013, obliges the signatories to give effect in their 
national laws to the rules set out therein through binding and perma-
nent provisions, preferably those of a constitutional nature, which will 
guarantee that they will be fully respected and adhered to throughout 
the domestic budgetary processes. This Treaty also explicitly lays down 
that the correction mechanism envisaged in the event of signiﬁ cant devi-
ations from the agreed country-speciﬁ c medium-term budgetary targets 
‘shall fully respect the prerogatives of national parliaments’.26
The signatories of the Treaty are furthermore under the duty to take 
the necessary actions and measures in all the areas that are essential 
to the proper functioning of the euro area, especially those that foster 
competitiveness and employment as well as those that contribute to the 
sustainability and stability of public ﬁ nances.27 Insofar as these mea-
sures are to be adopted by national parliaments, they play a vital role in 
resuscitating the Eurozone. European leaders, policy makers, lobbyists, 
academics and citizens are keeping a close watch on the actions of na-
tional parliaments, since it is the representatives democratically elected 
23  Philipp Dann, ‘The Political Institutions’ in Bogdandy and Bast (n 20) 269.
24  See for instance Tapio Raunio, ‘National Parliaments and the Future of European In-
tegration: Learning to Play the Multilevel Game’ in Joan DeBardeleben and Achim Hurrel-
mann (eds), Democratic Dilemmas of Multilevel Governance: Legitimacy, Representation and 
Accountability in the European Union, (Palgrave Macmillan 2007); Philipp Kiiver, National 
Parliaments in the European Union: A Critical View on EU Constitution-Building (Kluwer Law 
International 2006).
25  European Council, Meeting of 24-25 March 2011, Presidency Conclusions, point 6 on p 
3 and Annex I on p 19.
26  Article 3(2) EU Fiscal Treaty.
27  Article 9 EU Fiscal Treaty.
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by the taxpayers who enjoy the power of the purse. Besides deciding on 
national budgets, these representatives are the ones who approve bail-
outs of the defaulting Eurozone economies and who adopt laws whose 
effect may well reverberate and affect markets, not solely in the Eurozone 
but across the globe.
Moreover, the Fiscal Treaty makes a reference to the Lisbon Treaty 
Protocol on the role of national parliaments and states that it is up to the 
European Parliament and national parliaments jointly to determine the 
organisation of a conference of representatives of their respective com-
mittees that are in charge of budgetary policies and other matters aris-
ing from this Treaty.28 Interparliamentary cooperation is thus extended 
to the ﬁ scal area and some regard this as a case in favour of reinstating 
the Assizes, which was a one-off meeting of MPs and MEPs that failed to 
continue beyond its debut in 1990.29
Another important international agreement was signed on 11 July 
2011 by the ﬁ nance ministers of the seventeen Eurozone Member States. 
The Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) cre-
ates a permanent international rescue funding institution called, as the 
treaty name suggests, the European Stability Mechanism. This institu-
tion succeeds the existing two temporary bailout mechanisms, the Euro-
pean Financial Stability Facility and the European Financial Stabilisa-
tion Mechanism. Upon the ratiﬁ cation of the treaty, this new institution 
will provide ﬁ nancial assistance to the Eurozone Member States that 
experience or are threatened by severe ﬁ nancing problems, but only if 
strict predetermined conditions are fulﬁ lled and if such assistance is 
indispensable to safeguard the ﬁ nancial stability of the euro area as a 
whole and of its Member States.30 Unlike the Fiscal Treaty, which ad-
dresses the function of national parliaments, the ESM Treaty only pro-
vides that the Board of Governors of the ESM shall make the institution’s 
annual report accessible to national parliaments.31 No active participa-
tion by these parliaments is foreseen nor is any consequence attached 
to possible ensuing assessments of these reports in domestic parliamen-
tary chambers. 
Against this background, one wonders about the effect of these de-
velopments on national parliaments. Does the Eurozone crisis reinforce 
or further aggravate the already shaky position of national parliaments 
in the European Union? Recent pronouncements thereon by the Euro-
28  Article 13 EU Fiscal Treaty.
29  Ruth Fox, ‘Europe, Democracy and the Economic Crisis: Is It Time to Reconstitute the 
“Assises”?’ (2012) 65(2) Parliamentary Affairs 463.
30  Articles 3 and 12 of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism.
31  Article 30(5) of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism.
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pean Council President, Herman Van Rompuy, serve as a fertile start-
ing point. In his speech at Humboldt University on 6 February 2012, 
Van Rompuy highlighted that the ongoing crisis fortiﬁ es the Union and 
brings to the fore the interdependence and co-responsibility among the 
Member States, its leaders and institutions, including parliaments:
Sixty years of integration has taught us that Europe is not built by 
dissolving Member States, but by infusing them ever more deeply…
what we are currently going through is not a ‘renationalisation of 
European politics’, no, it is the ‘Europeanisation of national political 
life’…The need for national money and therefore the involvement of 
national leaders and parliaments is simply a fact…Within this new 
division of labour, the national parliaments fully keep their budget-
ary sovereignty (at least as long as national policies do not threaten 
the ﬁ nancial stability of the euro itself!). Nevertheless there is some 
uneasiness among national politicians about the EU’s new tasks…
the feeling of co-responsibility isn’t felt as strongly in national par-
liaments as it could be…Every national MP should therefore take 
an interest in talking to fellow parliamentarians in Strasbourg and 
in other member states…In meetings of the European Council, one 
feels the presence of all these parliaments...Many national leaders, 
in our discussions, refer to the position of their parliament, to defend 
speciﬁ c amendments…Europe needs not only political action, but 
also positive attitudes towards its task. Particularly from its political 
representatives.32
Three weeks later, at an interparliamentary meeting on the Euro-
pean Semester,33 Van Rompuy reiterated that:
Via national leaders and governments, national parliaments have 
also become more implicated than ever in the day-to-day business 
of the Eurozone…Decisions by one national parliament - be it in 
Germany or Ireland, in Slovakia or Portugal - are watched all over 
Europe. Maybe not formally speaking, but at least politically speak-
ing, all national parliaments have become, in a way, European in-
stitutions. This is political interdependence: the decisions of one af-
fect all…As an outsider, I sometimes have the impression that the 
European Parliament and the national parliaments live in different 
worlds: the one always pushing for more integration, the others fo-
cusing on domestic issues and pulling the brakes. That is why it 
is important to understand each other’s perspective!…Here the old 
slogan of the three musketeers applies: ‘All for one; one for all!’ It 
32  Speech at the Humboldt University, Walter Hallstein Institute for European Constitu-
tional Law, speech no EUCO 21/12, Berlin.
33  See below under Heading 6. 
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is the responsibility of the parliaments to adapt themselves to this 
situation.34
Are we therefore moving towards a new type of Union in which the 
essential segments of national sovereignty are debunked? Sufﬁ ce it to re-
call the July 2009 judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
on the Lisbon Treaty. In taking a stance that sovereignty is a divisible 
concept, the BVerfG ruled that, along with certain other competences,35 
the ﬁ scal ones represent ‘especially sensitive’ ﬁ elds that form the very 
core of state sovereignty.36 This approach, although much criticised in 
academic circles,37 exposes the fact that the Fiscal Treaty and the EU’s 
sovereign debt crisis pose a new challenge not only for the executive but 
also for national parliaments as the EU steps into what most Member 
States would consider the nucleus of their legal independence and sov-
ereignty.
In a similar vein, in September 2011 the BVerfG handed down an-
other judgment in this regard.38 Three constitutional complaints that 
were directed against the Monetary Union Financial Stabilisation Act, 
which approves the provision of ﬁ nancial aid to Greece, and against the 
Act Concerning the Giving of Guarantees in the Framework of a Euro-
pean Stabilisation Mechanism, which refers to the rescue package, were 
rejected. These two statutes were found not to violate the right of the 
Bundestag to adopt the budget and control its implementation by the 
Federal Government. They were ruled compatible with Article 38 of the 
German Basic Law, which enshrines the right of eligible German citi-
zens to elect members of the Bundestag. Yet the latter statute was found 
constitutional only on the condition that it is interpreted consistently 
with the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), which means that before giving any 
ﬁ nancial guarantees the Federal Government is obligated to obtain prior 
approval from the Bundestag’s Budget Committee. Here we ﬁ nd another 
instance of a domestic parliament being deﬁ ned as a bulwark against 
encroachment by the Union into the national sovereignty of a Member 
State, in this case the Member State that is the largest contributor to the 
European Stability Mechanism. This ruling is in harmony with BVerfG’s 
34  Speech during the Interparliamentary Meeting on the European Semester for Economic 
Policy Coordination, doc no EUCO 31/12, Brussels, 27 February 2012.
35  Those related to criminal law, use of force, social policy, family law, education systems 
and religion.
36  JanËiÊ (n 13) 354.
37 Daniel Halberstam and Christoph Möllers, ‘The German Constitutional Court Says “Ja 
zu Deutschland!”’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 1241 and 1249; Christoph Schönberger, 
‘Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht’s Epigones at Sea’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 1201 
and 1209.
38  BVerfG, Judgment no 2 BvR 987/10 of 7 September 2011.
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previous case law, which has constantly underlined the importance and 
primacy of the German national parliament in legitimising EU integra-
tion.
Evaluating the crisis-induced role of national parliaments in the 
post-Lisbon period is not a straightforward task. On the one hand, these 
parliaments have been brought into the limelight of EU decision making 
and have been called upon to keep the Eurozone aﬂ oat, which they do 
by performing the legislative and budgetary functions as direct popular 
representatives of the citizens. They also do that by controlling the activ-
ity of the national governments in the many ongoing negotiations about 
the future of the euro. On the other hand, they act under enormous 
political pressure to adopt the measures recommended by EU institu-
tions, so that their room for manoeuvre is politically, albeit not legally, 
restricted. In a situation where every day of inaction means greater debt, 
this pressure is more than tangible and threatens to tie the hands of na-
tional parliaments in the spirit of what Van Rompuy termed ‘co-respon-
sibility’. This politically constraining factor of parliamentary activity in 
European affairs is not novel, however. It has been present ever since 
the foundation of the Communities, whereby parliaments bore the heavy 
burden of approving the deals already made by national governments 
during intergovernmental conferences.
What is new about the national parliaments’ position in the circum-
stances of the present crisis is that it is no longer the purely legislative 
and controlling functions that are at stake, but rather the function that 
is most fundamentally inherent in the notion of parliamentary repre-
sentation - that of budgetary authority. It is debatable nonetheless to 
what extent this power is still ‘theirs’ and whether this development is 
ephemeral and limited to the crisis or whether it will give rise to a more 
permanent alteration, or blurring rather, of the competence boundaries 
between the Union and the Member States.
5. EU constitutionalism and national parliaments: alternatives for 
hierarchy?
Theoretical attacks on the understandings of the European Union 
as a constitutional entity that is supreme and hierarchically superior to 
the Member States have been made for some time.39 One way to conceive 
of this evolution was conveniently reported by Weiler and Trachtman 
some ﬁ fteen years ago:
39  Leonard Besselink, A Composite European Constitution (European Law Publishing 2007) 
8-9.
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European constitutionalism must depend on a common law-type 
rationale, one which draws on and integrates the national consti-
tutional orders, and the constitutional discourse in Europe must be 
conceived of as a conversation of many actors in a constitutional in-
terpretative community rather than a hierarchical structure […].40
In most general terms, postnational pluralism has been posited as an 
alternative to traditional, hierarchical, state-derived constitutionalism. 
In his recent account, Krisch held that:
Postnational pluralism recognises the blurred separation of layers 
of law but does not seek to reorganise them in an overarching legal 
framework, as does constitutionalism. It envisages a heterarchical 
structure in which the interaction of different layers is not ultimately 
determined by one legal rule but inﬂ uenced by a variety of (poten-
tially conﬂ icting) norms emanating from each of the layers. Between 
the different layers, there is no common point of reference in law; 
their relationship is fundamentally open and depends, in large part, 
on political factors.41
In the words of another author, in the European Union ‘[t]here is no 
uniform legal order, ie a single hierarchy of rules and single hierarchy 
of institutions’.42 It is this multiplicity of legal and constitutional sources 
that triggers our problematisation of the European role of national par-
liaments. Other constitutionalist models, which we explain below, offer 
a more concrete conceptualisation of the role of national parliaments in 
the material EU constitution.
A sibling of multilevel governance, Pernice’s multilevel constitution-
alism, implies that the European constitution consists of both national 
constitutions and EU Treaties. In such a constellation, EU and Member-
State institutions are intertwined and dependent on each other, even 
though they belong to different, formally separate levels of government.43 
In a sense, national constitutional actors act as ‘European agencies’.44 
National parliaments hence feature as European parliaments that are 
40  Joseph HH Weiler and Joel P Trachtman, ‘European Constitutionalism and its Discon-
tents’ (1996-1997) 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 391. See 
the most recent discussions in Gráinne de Búrca and Joseph HH Weiler (eds), The Worlds 
of European Constitutionalism (CUP 2012).
41  Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (OUP 
2010) 298.
42  Pavlos Eleftheriadis, ‘The Standing of States in the European Union’ in Nicholas Tsa-
gourias (ed), Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Models (CUP 
2007) 69.
43  Ingolf Pernice, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European 
Constitution-Making Revisited (1999) 36 CML Rev 707 and 710.
44  Pernice (n 43) 718.
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indispensable to the Union, although their role in EU decision making 
is complementary to that of the European Parliament.45 However, the 
concept of levels has not remained unchallenged. For instance, Cananea 
held that levels are a ‘biased metaphor’ that implies hierarchy.46
The same has also been held by Besselink,47 who offered a com-
peting model, that of composite or polycentric constitutionalism. He, too, 
relies on constitutional interdependence between EU and national insti-
tutions within an overarching composite constitutional order that keeps 
these two components together in a coherent fashion.48 This polycen-
tric view of interinstitutional relations in the Union hypothesises that 
boundaries between the European and national levels do not exist. Na-
tional parliaments thus freely interact with EU institutions as their im-
mediate counterparts. Indicators of such parliamentary action include 
situations where: parliaments request and receive information on draft 
EU legislation directly from the Commission; representatives of the Com-
mission visit parliaments to explain their policies; national ministers are 
asked to justify not only the government’s but also the Union’s legislative 
plans and programmes;49 parliaments not merely defend the position to 
be represented in the Council but also put forth political views or ideas 
that, although communicated to the minister, are addressed to EU in-
stitutions.50 Yet, as Kiiver emphasised, the mutual interdependence be-
tween the activities of the parliaments of different Member States is not 
self-evident, as parliaments primarily focus on the action of their own 
governments in EU matters and pay little heed to similar occurrences in 
other Member States.51
A further theoretical concretisation of the relations between Eu-
rope’s parliaments ﬁ nds its shape in what Crum and Fossum have called 
45  Ingolf Pernice, ‘The Role of National Parliaments in the European Union,” (2001) Walter 
Halstein Institute Paper 5/01, 17.
46  Giacinto della Cananea, ‘Is European Constitutionalism Really “Multilevel”?’ 2010 70(1) 
Heidelberg Journal of International Law 307.
47  Besselink (n 39) 6.
48  Leonard Besselink, ‘Case C-145/04, Spain v. United Kingdom, judgment of the Grand 
Chamber of 12 September 2006; Case C-300/04, Eman and Sevinger, judgment of the 
Grand Chamber of 12 September 2006; ECtHR (Third Section), 6 September 2007, Applica-
tions Nos 17173/07 and 17180/07, Oslin Benito Sevinger and Michiel Godfried Eman v. 
the Netherlands (Sevinger and Eman)’ (2008) 45 CML Rev 803.
49  Besselink (n 39) 18-19.
50  Leonard Besselink, ‘National Parliaments in the EU’s Composite Constitution: A Plea for 
a Shift in Paradigm’ in Philipp Kiiver (ed), National and Regional Parliaments in the European 
Constitutional Order (Europa Law Publishing 2006) 119 and 125.
51  Philipp Kiiver, ‘European Scrutiny in National Parliaments: Individual Efforts in the Col-
lective Interest?’ in John O’Brennan and Tapio Raunio (eds), National Parliaments within the 
Enlarged European Union (Routledge 2007) 75-76.
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the ‘multilevel parliamentary ﬁ eld’. In this ﬁ eld, the European Parliament 
and national parliaments are rightly observed as sharing the vocation of 
political representation.52 The most innovative aspect of their analysis is 
the introduction of role perceptions that structure and guide interparlia-
mentary interaction. These are conceived through the notion of ‘habitus’, 
which refers to the mental dispositions and presuppositions of the par-
ticipating actors. The European and national parliamentarians share 
the same role as parliamentarians and the query is speciﬁ cally targeted 
at whether MPs and MEPs of a given Member State reinforce each other 
or compete for authority.53
In sum, as Hofmann underscores, a fundamental feature of parlia-
mentary representation in the multilayered European Union is coopera-
tion between parliamentary forums.54 Developing closer ties across levels 
could lead to coordinated approaches to legislation and to the imple-
mentation of EU norms.55 The importance of these informal channels of 
national parliamentary involvement in European affairs lies in the argu-
ment that ‘even without a direct representation of national parliamen-
tarians in EU decision making, national and sub-national parliaments 
may add to the legitimacy of European governance in a variety of ways’.56 
Many other commentators have also advocated a more direct implication 
of national parliaments in EU policy and decision making.57
6. Interparliamentary cooperation across the EU and national levels 
Whereas interparliamentary cooperation in the EU is encouraged 
through COSAC, the national and European parliaments are neverthe-
52  Ben Crum and John E Fossum, ‘Multilevel Parliamentary Field: A Framework for Theo-
rising Representative Democracy in the EU’ (2009) 1(2) European Political Science Review 
252 and 260.
53  Crum and Fossum (n 52) 262-263.
54  Herwig CH Hofmann, ‘Parliamentary Representation in Europe’s System of Multilevel 
Constitutions: A Case Study of Germany’ (2003) 10(1) Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 63.
55  Hofmann (n 54) 62.
56  Hofmann (n 54) 65.
57  See Tapio Raunio, ‘National Parliaments and European Integration: What We Know and 
Agenda for Future Research’ (2009) 15(4) Journal of Legislative Studies 317; Luc Verhey, 
‘Political Accountability: A Useful Concept in EU Inter-institutional Relations’ in Luc Verhey 
et al (eds), Political Accountability and European Integration (Europa Law Publishing 2009) 
68; John O’Brennan and Tapio Raunio, ‘Conclusion: National Parliaments Gradually Learn-
ing to Play the European Game’ in John O’Brennan and Tapio Raunio (eds), National Parlia-
ments Within the Enlarged European Union: From Victims of Integration to Competitive Ac-
tors? (Routledge 2007) 273; Olaf Tans, ‘Conclusion: National Parliaments and the European 
Union: Coping with the Limits of Democracy’ in Tans (n 14) 242; Asteris Pliakos, ‘National 
Parliaments and the European Union: Necessity of Assigning a Supranational Role’ (2007) 
19(3) European Review of Public Law 778.
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less free to decide how to organise and promote effective and regular mu-
tual dialogue.58 Outside the explicit framework of the Treaties, a plethora 
of interparliamentary meetings have been organised.59
The Conference of Speakers, ﬁ rst held in 1963 in Italy, is convened 
annually to debate topical issues of European integration and parlia-
mentary supervision. For instance, the gathering of this Conference held 
in April 2011 decided that the existing meetings of COFAC (Conference of 
Foreign Affairs Committees) and CODAC (Conference of Defence Affairs 
Committees) would be replaced by an Interparliamentary Conference for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Secu-
rity and Defence policy (CSDP), which would invite the High Representa-
tive to appear before it and which would be entitled to adopt non-binding 
conclusions by consensus.60
Joint parliamentary meetings are co-chaired by the Speakers of the 
European Parliament and of the national parliament of the Member State 
holding the EU Presidency. These meetings focus on areas where the 
Union does not legislate but nonetheless exercises important decision-
making powers, such as the Lisbon Strategy, CFSP and CSDP, economic 
and monetary policy, enlargement, energy policy and climate change as 
well as the more general ‘Future of Europe’ themes. The objective of this 
forum is not to formulate common positions of parliamentarians but to 
promote strengthened parliamentary oversight of intergovernmental and 
non-legislative EU decisions. The impression of the present author, who 
personally attended one of these meetings, is that joint parliamentary 
meetings provide primarily an opportunity for parliamentarians to state 
the prevailing positions of their parliaments and to exchange informa-
tion, which mostly occurs informally on the margins of the often vague 
and overly generalised discussions in the plenary sessions.61
Interparliamentary committee meetings with national parliaments 
represent another format of cooperation among EU parliaments. Unlike 
joint parliamentary meetings, interparlamentary committee meetings 
centre principally on EU policies decided by the ordinary legislative pro-
cedure, in which the European Parliament plays a co-equal role with 
58  Articles 9 and 10 of Protocol no 1 on the Role of National Parliaments in the European 
Union. This protocol originates in the Protocol bearing the same name that was attached to 
the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997.
59  See especially the European Parliament’s website <www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/
cms/lang/en/pid/3;jsessionid=DA626D97129515A6038F4BF26803F025> accessed 6 
March 2012.
60  Conference of Speakers, Meeting of 4-5 April 2011, Presidency conclusion no 5.
61  Observations from the Joint Parliamentary Meeting on the Western Balkans ‘Achieving 
the European Perspective for South East Europe’ which took place in Brussels from 26 to 
27 May 2008.
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the Council of Ministers. The purpose of these gatherings is to spur the 
exchange of views between MPs and MEPs and, consequently, to inﬂ u-
ence the position of the European Parliament in the legislative process. 
They are organised at the initiative of the relevant committees of the 
European Parliament, who invite their counterparts in national parlia-
ments. For example, the meeting held on 27-28 February 2012 addressed 
the so-called ‘European Semester for Economic Policy Coordination’, a 
six-month cyclical period which, since 2011, is set to run every year with 
the aim of coordinating at the EU level the Member States’ budgetary, 
macroeconomic and structural policies. The aim is to allow the Member 
States to take EU considerations into account at an early stage of their 
national budgetary processes. 
Joint committee meetings are essentially the same as joint parlia-
mentary meetings, except that they take place at the level of specialised 
committees of the national and European parliaments. In addition, nu-
merous ad hoc committee-to-committee meetings between the European 
Parliament and national parliaments are organised at the initiative of 
the former or the latter.
Structural parliamentary reforms are another signiﬁ cant catalyst of 
cross-level interaction. These include the establishment of a Directorate 
for relations with national parliaments within the European Parliament; 
the empowerment of European Affairs Committees of national parlia-
ments; an increased involvement of sectoral committees in the scrutiny 
of EU policies; the appointment of liaison ofﬁ cers, advisers and admin-
istrators within national parliaments; the appointment of permanent 
representatives of national parliaments (so-called ‘antennas’) in Brus-
sels and basing them on the premises of the European Parliament, etc. 
These channels of a more informal collaboration, though less visible to 
the public, may substantially contribute to a seamless ﬂ ow of informa-
tion between clerks and persons in charge of the dossiers in the EU leg-
islative pipeline.
It could thus be held that the Lisbon Treaty novelties and the suc-
cessive changes in the domestic competences of Member-State parlia-
ments represent an ‘increasingly strong mutual interrelation between 
national institutions and European institutions, and, as a consequence, 
between national constitutional law and European law in the ﬁ eld of 
organisational law’.62 Still, despite these enhancements, there exist solid 
reasons to further incentivise the interaction between the European Par-
liament and national parliaments in EU decision making. On the one 
hand, it has been argued that once decisions are taken at the suprana-
62  Christoph Grabenwarter, ‘National Constitutional Law Relating to the European Union’ 
in Bogdandy and Bast, Principles of European Constitutional Law (n 20) 116.
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tional level, both political control and representation must also happen 
at that level, because decisions taken intergovernmentally are democrat-
ically counterbalanced by the unanimity rule, which affords the Member 
States the right of veto and enables national parliaments to exert some 
degree of inﬂ uence through a stricter control of the government. ‘It is in 
this respect’, the argument goes, ‘that the European Parliament has a 
unique function that cannot be fulﬁ lled by national parliaments’.63 On 
the other hand, national parliaments are unique inasmuch as they are 
the only institutions that are entitled to hold individual Council mem-
bers to account for their actions at the EU level.64
7. Political practice examined: any heterarchy in sight?
By sifting through the practice arising from COSAC subsidiarity 
checks, the political dialogue within the framework of the Barroso Initia-
tive and the early warning mechanism, we seek to determine the state 
of affairs in the cross-level dialogue between domestic legislatures and 
EU institutions. Heterarchy is understood here as a framework that af-
fords national parliaments an alternative channel of information and 
potential inﬂ uence in EU affairs that analytically decouples them from 
the traditional constitutional linkage with their governments. The inﬂ u-
ence, instead, is refocused at the EU level itself. This is a crucial aspect, 
because the utility and effectiveness of national parliamentary scrutiny 
as a technique for legitimising EU decision making is not merely a mat-
ter of Treaty rights but also of ‘the informal behaviour of supranational 
institutions as well as their perceptions of the democratic needs of inte-
gration’.65
Indeed, instances where national parliaments liaise or act interde-
pendently with EU institutions outside the existing cooperative frame-
works, ie as a matter of scrutiny or legislative business of each individual 
parliament, are rare and mainly occur where issues deliberated at the 
EU level arouse great national interest, jeopardise it or explicitly conﬂ ict 
with it.66 We therefore zoom in on the actual practice stemming from the 
63  Jacques Thomassen and Hermann Schmitt, ‘In Conclusion: Political Representation and 
Legitimacy in the European Union’ in Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen (eds), Po-
litical Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union (OUP 1999) 256.
64  Leonard Besselink and Brecht van Mourik, ‘The Roles of the National Parliament and 
the European Parliament in EU Decision-Making: The Approval of the Lisbon Treaty in the 
Netherlands’ (2009) 15(3) European Public Law 316.
65  Lindseth (n 12) 243.
66  An excellent example thereof is the cross-level institutional interdependence between the 
adoption of the so-called Loi Hadopi in France and the adoption in the same period of the 
EU telecoms reform package. These two dossiers contained conﬂ icting provisions, which 
sparked intricate relationships across the EU and French levels of governance. See more in 
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operation of the existing forums for direct cross-level interinstitutional 
dialogue: (a) between national parliaments and the European Parliament 
(COSAC); and (b) between national parliaments and the Commission (the 
Barroso Initiative and the early warning mechanism).
7.1. COSAC: marshalling interparliamentary coordination
7.1.1. Origin and functioning of COSAC
The interparliamentary forum known as COSAC is the brainchild 
of Laurent Fabius, the then President of the French Assemblée nationale, 
who proposed its creation at the Conference of Speakers in Madrid in 
May 1989 with a view to establishing closer ties with Community policy 
making at a time when the double mandate of national parliamentarians 
had been cancelled in many Member States for a decade.67
Ever since, twice a year, six-member delegations from national par-
liaments have been joined by six MEPs in the parliament of the Member 
State holding the Presidency of the Council to discuss topics of common 
interest and exchange information and best practice on current scrutiny 
business.68
COSAC was formally recognised only in 1997 in a protocol attached 
to the Amsterdam Treaty. It was then agreed that COSAC could send 
to EU institutions any contributions on legislative proposals or initia-
tives, in particular those related to the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, the application of subsidiarity and questions regarding funda-
mental rights. However, these contributions could neither bind national 
parliaments nor prejudge their position.69 The Lisbon Treaty added in 
2007 that COSAC may organise interparliamentary conferences on spe-
ciﬁ c topics, such as on CFSP and CSDP.70 As we have seen, the Fiscal 
Treaty proposes the organisation of such conferences in the budgetary 
ﬁ eld, too.
Davor JanËiÊ, ‘The European Political Order and Internet Piracy: Accidental or Paradigmatic 
Constitution-shaping?’ (2010) 6(3) European Constitutional Law Review 430.
67  Lord Tordoff, ‘The Conference of European Affairs Committees: A Collective Voice for 
National Parliaments in the European Union’ (2000) 6(4) Journal of Legislative Studies 1.
68  Morten Knudsen and Yves Carl, ‘COSAC - Its Role to Date and Its Potential in the Future’ 
in Gavin Barrett (ed), National Parliaments and the European Union: The Constitutional Chal-
lenge for the Oireachtas and Other Member State Legislatures (Clarus Press 2008) 475.
69  Points 4-7 of the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union 
attached to the Amsterdam Treaty.
70  Articles 9-10 of the Protocol on the Role National Parliaments in the European Union 
attached to the Lisbon Treaty.
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Over the years, COSAC has grown into a coordinator of national 
parliamentary activities in EU matters.71 It played a vital role in setting 
in motion the national parliaments’ subsidiarity checks, although these 
have been discontinued upon the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
due to the presumed lack of necessity for such coordination.72 Further-
more, COSAC publishes biannual reports and the national parliaments’ 
replies to comprehensive questionnaires on a variety of topics of direct 
relevance for European scrutiny. These reports are particularly useful 
as they provide not only information but often also reﬂ ections by the ac-
tors directly involved in the scrutiny of EU affairs. As such, they can be 
a valuable research tool.
7.1.2. Subsidiarity checks 
To date, COSAC has conducted a total of eight coordinated subsid-
iarity checks, which are speciﬁ ed in the table below.
Table 1 - List of subsidiarity checks
Proposal name
No of 
chambers 
detecting 
breach(es)
No of 
participating 
chambers 
within deadline
1.
3rd Railway Package:
- Regulation on compensation in cases of 
non-compliance with contractual quality 
requirements for rail freight services
- Directive on the certiﬁ cation of train crews 
operating locomotives and trains on the 
Community’s rail network
- Council Directive on the development of 
the Community’s railways
10
5
3
31
2.
Council Regulation amending Regulation 
(EC) No 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction 
and introducing rules concerning applicable 
law in matrimonial matters, COM(2006) 399 
ﬁ nal of 17 July 2006
5 (B Senate, 
NL TK&EK, 
UK Lords, 
CZ Senate)
11
71  Matthieu Houser, ‘La COSAC, une instance européenne à la croisée des chemins’ (2005) 
2 Revue du Droit de l’Union Européenne 357.
72  A former permanent member of the COSAC Secretariat and the current senior adviser in 
the Secretariat General of the Lithuanian Parliament, Loreta Raulinaityte
.
, opined that the 
discontinuation was premature, since it had provided a cohesive tissue that tied national 
parliamentary reactions to a more or less uniﬁ ed schedule. Oral presentation at the confer-
ence ‘Parliaments in the European Union after Lisbon’, Maastricht, 23-24 February 2012.
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Proposal name
No of 
chambers 
detecting 
breach(es)
No of 
participating 
chambers 
within deadline
3. Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council
amending Directive 97/67/EC concerning 
the full accomplishment of the internal 
market of Community postal services, 
COM(2006) 594 ﬁ nal of 18 October 2006
1 (LU) 10
4. Council Framework Decision amending 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on 
combating terrorism COM(2007) 650 ﬁ nal of 
6 November 2007
1 (UK 
Commons)
25
5. Council Directive on implementing the 
principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation, 
COM(2008) 426 ﬁ nal of 2 July 2008
2 (IE 
Oireachtas)
17
6. Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council 
on standards of quality and safety of 
human organs intended for transplantation, 
COM(2008) 818 of 8 December 2008
1 (AT 
Bundesrat)
27
7. Council Framework Decision on the right to 
interpretation and to translation in criminal 
proceedings, COM(2009) 338 ﬁ nal of 8 July 
2009
4 (AT 
Bundesrat, 
IE 
Oireachtas 
& Malta)
21
8. Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on jurisdiction, applicable 
law, recognition and enforcement of 
decisions and authentic instruments in 
matters of succession and the creation 
of a European Certiﬁ cate of Succession, 
COM(2009)154 ﬁ nal of 14 October 2009
1 (B Senate) 36
Source: COSAC subsidiarity check reports73 
The data presented in Table 1 demonstrates that, with the excep-
tion of the 3rd Railway Package, which was the ﬁ rst pilot project, national 
parliaments have as a rule found a negligible number of subsidiarity 
breaches. According to COSAC reports on subsidiarity checks, national 
parliaments mostly experience the following difﬁ culties or problems in 
the course of subsidiarity assessment:
73  See COSAC < http://www.cosac.eu/en/info/earlywarning/> accessed 3 March 2012.
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• Lack of sufﬁ cient arguments justifying the proposals in terms of 
subsidiarity;
• Lack of ofﬁ cial translation into all the languages of the EU Mem-
ber States;
• Time constraints regarding the deadline for submission of reac-
tions (currently 8 weeks);
• Distinguishing between subsidiarity and proportionality; and
• Lack of interparliamentary cooperation in order to know about 
the results of scrutiny in other national parliaments.
These cursory ﬁ ndings on the functioning of subsidiarity monitor-
ing by national parliaments can be interpreted in a twofold manner. On 
the one hand, they exhibit the inability of domestic parliamentarians to 
adapt to the rules of the post-Lisbon multilevel decision-making game 
both in organisational terms (eg meeting the deadline, accessing the 
right language version of the text, etc) and in substantive terms (eg the 
inability to differentiate between the principles that may be challenged), 
but this is not surprising given the novelty of the procedure. On the 
other hand, this could mean that the Commission uses its legislative 
and policy-making powers judiciously and that it as a rule meets the 
expectations of a majority of national parliaments. The latter is prone 
to fortify the democratic legitimacy of the resulting EU decisions to a 
certain extent.
Bearing in mind the outcomes of the coordinated subsidiarity 
checks and the very high thresholds necessary to oblige the Commis-
sion to alter its proposals, it seems that the subsidiarity guardianship 
role of national parliaments should best be understood as a catalyst 
for a more comprehensive scrutiny of EU policy.74 Restricting scrutiny 
only to subsidiarity threatens to drag the attention of MPs and sena-
tors away from evaluating the policy routes suggested by the Union, the 
action of the national government and the substantive policy dialogue 
among EU institutions.
74  Philipp Kiiver, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon, the National Parliaments, and the Principle of Sub-
sidiarity’ (2008) 15 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 82.
249CYELP 8 [2012] 227-266
7.2. The Barroso Initiative: narrowing the gap with national 
parliaments
7.2.1. Origin and functioning of the Barroso Initiative
As explained elsewhere in greater detail,75 in May 2006 the Com-
mission announced its intention to transmit all new proposals and con-
sultation papers, such as Green and White Papers, directly to national 
parliaments. In order to streamline the EU policy-making process, the 
latter were invited to send their reactions, opinions and other political 
considerations to the Commission.76 This was endorsed at the June 2006 
European Council meeting:
The European Council notes the interdependence of the European 
and national legislative processes. It therefore welcomes the Com-
mission’s commitment to make all new proposals and consultation 
papers directly available to national parliaments, inviting them to 
react so as to improve the process of policy formulation. The Com-
mission is asked to duly consider comments by national parliaments 
- in particular with regard to the subsidiarity and proportionality 
principles. National parliaments are encouraged to strengthen coop-
eration within the framework of the Conference of European Affairs 
Committees (COSAC) when monitoring subsidiarity.77
The Barroso Initiative has been operational since September 2006. 
It is a broad political dialogue between the Commission and national 
parliaments on all aspects of the former’s legislative agenda. The Initia-
tive primarily encompasses the invigilation by national parliaments of 
the Commission’s compliance with the principles of subsidiarity, pro-
portionality, conferral and political accountability. The involvement of 
national parliaments in the political enforcement of these cornerstone 
EU principles is an important, albeit rudimentary, element of an evolv-
ing multilevel system of EU representative democracy. To wit, whereas 
control over the principle of conferral ensures that the EU possesses the 
competence to act, control over the principles of subsidiarity, proportion-
ality and political accountability ensures that the EU uses its existing 
competence in harmony with the conditions agreed between the Member 
States as Masters of the Treaties. The Barroso Initiative furthermore al-
lows national parliaments to assess any other legal and political aspect 
of proposed EU legislation, such as the opportuneness and desirability 
75  Davor JanËiÊ, ‘The Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing or Democracy Boost?’ (2012) 8 
Utrecht Law Review 78.
76  European Commission, Communication ‘A Citizens’ Agenda: Delivering Results for Eu-
rope’ COM (2006) 211, 10 May 2006, 9.
77  Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council of 15-16 June 2006, para 37.
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of action. All of this is done by examining the substance of draft EU acts 
and the Commission’s instruments of legislative planning, the most sig-
niﬁ cant of which are annual policy strategies and legislative and work 
programmes. 
The Initiative functions in two main modes: (a) in the early phase of 
the Commission’s policy-making cycle in order to impart national con-
cerns to its draft legislative proposals; and (b) at any other time through 
a motley array of visits to national parliaments by Commission ofﬁ cials, 
meetings with national parliamentary committees and permanent par-
liamentary representatives to the EU, and gatherings in various inter-
parliamentary forums.
7.2.2. The political dialogue in practice
Since the initiation of the Barroso Initiative, the political dialogue 
with national parliaments has intensiﬁ ed. In the period from 1 January 
2005 to 31 December 2008, the Commission had a total of 521 contacts 
with national parliaments. In addition, from September 2006 to June 
2012, the Commission received a total of 2,027 opinions from national 
parliaments, including those within the early warning mechanism.78 In 
2011 alone, which is the last reporting year, the Commission received 
a total of 622 opinions, which is an increase of some 60% compared to 
2010. These data testify to growing interest among national parliamen-
tarians in political dialogue on EU policies. 
An EU proposal that elicited a signiﬁ cant number of reactions was 
the Seasonal Workers’ Directive.79 This Proposal received a total of 16 
opinions, of which nine reasoned opinions found a subsidiarity breach.80 
By way of example, we will examine the opinions on this proposal sub-
mitted by the parliamentary chambers of the Czech Republic, Germany, 
Spain, Italy and the Netherlands. These were chosen to take into ac-
count a geographical variety of the Member States (encompassing west-
78  European Commission, Annual report 2009 on relations between the European Com-
mission and national parliaments COM (2010) 291, 2 June 2010, 2; European Commission, 
Annual report 2010 on relations between the European Commission and national parlia-
ments, COM (2011) 345, 10 June 2011, 5; European Commission, Annual report 2011 on 
relations between the European Commission and national parliaments COM (2012) 375, 
10 July 2012, 4.
79  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions 
of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment 
COM (2010) 379 of 13 July 2010.
80  See additional information on the national parliamentary scrutiny activities regarding 
this Proposal at <http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/document/COM20100379FIN.
do> accessed 10 March 2012. See also <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/rela-
tions/relations_other/npo/index_en.htm> accessed 10 March 2012.
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ern, central and southern Europe) but also to present the diversity of 
national parliamentary reactions within the framework of the Barroso 
Initiative. The other Member States that sent their opinions and views on 
this Proposal were the British House of Commons and House of Lords, 
the Portuguese Assembleia da República, the Austrian Nationalrat and 
Bundesrat, the Polish Sejm and Senate, the Latvian Saeima and the Lith-
uanian Seimas.
A) The Czech Republic
After hearing the 1st Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs and the 
Director of the International Cooperation Department of the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs, the European Affairs Committee of the Czech 
Chamber of Deputies adopted on 7 October 2010 a resolution contain-
ing a reasoned opinion on subsidiarity infringement. This is due to the 
fact that ‘the situation of third-country nationals who really consider 
a seasonal work in the Czech Republic can be tackled according to the 
legislation in force’. Furthermore, the Czech MPs found that the Proposal 
brought no added value because of the differences in the forms of sea-
sonal or other short-term work across the EU.81 No further substantia-
tion was offered about the reasons why subsidiarity was deemed to be 
breached. In its reply, the Commission provided a comprehensive over-
view of its comments on the objections and considerations of all other 
national parliaments, which was to address the Chamber’s concerns.82 
Similarly, albeit in slightly greater detail, the Czech Senate passed a 
resolution on 22 June 2010 detecting a subsidiarity violation. The sena-
tors were of the opinion that the conditions of entry and residence of sea-
sonal workers ‘can be adequately regulated on the national level, while 
legal regulation on the EU level is neither necessary nor does it present 
an added value when compared to the current state, with regard to its 
extent and impacts’.83 However, the senators went further to comment on 
the substance of the Proposal. In this vein, they emphasised, inter alia: 
(a) that the need for regulating seasonal work differs across the Mem-
ber States due to different structures of their labour markets; (b) that 
the Proposal contains no effective mechanism to prevent third-country 
81  See Parliament of the Czech Republic, the Chamber of Deputies <http://ec.europa.
eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/docs/czech_republic/2010/
com20100379/com20100379_deputies_opinion_en.pdf> accessed 5 March 2012.
82  See European Commission <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/re-
lations_other/npo/docs/czech_republic/2010/com20100379/com20100379_deputies_re-
ply_en.pdf> accessed 5 March 2012.
83  See Parliament of the Czech Republic, the Senate <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secre-
tariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/docs/czech_republic/2010/com20100379/
com20100379_senate_opinion_en.pdf> accessed 5 March 2012.
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nationals who seek to ensure EU residence beyond six months from ap-
plying for a residence permit in another Member State once their original 
permit expires; (c) that laying down rules on circular migration should 
not be restricted to speciﬁ c sectors, such as agriculture or tourism, but 
should include other sectors such as the building industry; (d) that the 
Proposal might lead to seasonal workers enjoying a higher level of pro-
tection in the area of social welfare than nationals of the new Member 
States where the transitional periods regarding access to labour markets 
still apply; (e) that it is not possible precisely to identify the ﬁ nancial 
impacts of the guarantees that should be granted to seasonal workers 
in the area of social welfare; and (f) that the Proposal leads to new ad-
ministrative costs. 
The Commission sent the same reply as it did to the Czech MPs. In 
it, it addressed several of the senators’ points. It agreed that the demand 
for third-country seasonal workers varies among the Member States and 
pointed out that this had been stated in its impact assessment. To take 
account of the domestic speciﬁ cities, the Proposal envisaged the right 
of the Member States to decide the number of seasonal workers they 
admit, to apply a labour market test and to determine which sectors of 
the economy fall under seasonal work. Concerning the possibility of sea-
sonal workers seeking residence in other Member States after the expiry 
of the six-month period, the Commission stressed that it was indeed its 
express intention to allow third-country nationals to ﬁ nd a second sea-
sonal job, as the opposite solution would be unnecessarily restrictive for 
both employers and employees and would create additional burdens for 
the Member States. The Commission also underlined that a recital from 
the Proposal enshrines the principle of equal treatment and excludes the 
possibility of more rights being conferred to seasonal workers than what 
is already provided in the existing EU legislation.84
B) Germany
While the Bundestag remained silent, the Bundesrat adopted a reso-
lution on the Proposal on 24 September 2010 in accordance with the Act 
on Cooperation between the Federation and the Länder in Matters Relat-
ing to the European Union.85 This resolution did not address the ques-
tion of subsidiarity compliance but focused entirely on the substance of 
84  This explanation, in the view of this author, does not adequately address the Czech 
senators’ concern, because no differentiation is made between EU citizens from Member 
States that are subject to labour market access restrictions and those from Member States 
without such restrictions.
85  See Parliament of Germany, Bundesrat <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_gen-
eral/relations/relations_other/npo/docs/germany/2010/com20100379/com20100379_
bundesrat_opinion_en.pdf> accessed 5 March 2012.
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the Proposal. The members of the Bundesrat assessed that the existing 
legal arrangements governing the seasonal employment of third-country 
nationals is well balanced and ﬂ exible and that at most only a small ad-
justment was required. The Federal Government should therefore make 
sure that the Proposal does not contradict the current German legal 
framework and that it does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
its objectives. The latter is aimed at safeguarding the principle of propor-
tionality. The resolution, moreover, recommended the adoption of several 
amendments to the Proposal and called on the Federal Government to 
assert them in negotiations at the EU level. The proposed amendments 
suggest, among other things: (a) that the envisaged processing time for 
residence permit applications of 30 days is unjustiﬁ ably short and that 
it should be extended to 90 days; (b) that non-decision by the compe-
tent national authorities within the deadline should lead neither to the 
constructive approval of the permit nor to the right to compensation; 
(c) that the simpliﬁ ed re-entry procedure is not welcome since it might 
lead to abuses; (d) that a rule should be introduced that residence per-
mits would apply only to the Member State in which they are issued; 
(e) that family reuniﬁ cation should be expressly excluded; and (f) that 
statistics keeping duties of the Member States should be reduced. The 
Commission sent a response to most of these concerns.86 It stated that 
the short application processing time is needed to ensure the attractive-
ness of the scheme, to allow employers speedy access to the workforce 
and to communicate the decision to the applicant as soon as possible. 
Then, it reassured the Bundesrat that the consequences of non-decision 
within the deadline would be regulated by national law. The Commission 
furthermore iterated that instead of the simpliﬁ ed re-entry procedure, 
the Member States may opt for multi-seasonal permits. The statistics 
requirement is necessary for proper evaluation of the functioning of the 
proposed legal framework.
C) Spain
After examining the negative opinions of the Czech and Austrian 
parliaments, the Joint Committee for the European Union of the Span-
ish Parliament, Cortes Generales, adopted a report on 28 September 2010 
deciding that the Proposal was nonetheless in harmony with the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, primarily because most Member States need tem-
porary workers from third countries and because it helps combat illegal 
86  See European Commission <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/
relations_other/npo/docs/germany/2010/com20100379/com20100379_bundesrat_re-
ply_en.pdf> accessed 5 March 2012.
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immigration.87 The Proposal was also found to be in conformity with the 
principle of proportionality, because it leaves the Member States suf-
ﬁ cient ﬂ exibility in implementing it while at the same time avoiding the 
enactment of extremely complex and bureaucratic norms. The legal basis 
of the proposal was validated, too. Further, the Proposal was assessed 
as beneﬁ cial for all the parties concerned, since it provides guarantees 
and security and deﬁ nes the terms and conditions for the salaries and 
social protection of seasonal workers. In the Spanish parliamentarians’ 
eyes, the Proposal also respects the Member States’ right to determine 
the caps on the admission of third-country nationals. The Commission 
did not send a reply, most probably because the Spanish Parliament’s 
opinion was favourable.
D) Italy
Taking into account the standpoint of the Committee for European 
Union Policies, the Italian Lower House, Camera dei Deputati, adopted a 
favourable opinion on the Proposal.88 The latter was judged justiﬁ ed be-
cause it responds to a real demand for workforce that raises clear trans-
national issues. While praising the merits and approving the Proposal, 
the MPs invited the Government to advocate adequate discretion in the 
implementation of the rules in order to provide the Member States with 
the ﬂ exibility needed to accommodate the speciﬁ c characteristics of each 
economic system. For instance, an extension of the maximum duration 
of seasonal work permits beyond six months would beneﬁ t the Italian 
agricultural sector. The Chamber of Deputies also recommended an as-
sessment of the advisability of a more detailed regulation of penalties for 
employers who do not fulﬁ l their obligations, then of the consequences of 
granting more extensive social security rights to seasonal workers than 
what the national law provides, and of adding ‘threats to national secu-
rity’ as one of the grounds for refusing or revoking seasonal work permits 
so as to prevent the entry of potentially dangerous individuals. The Com-
mission’s reply tackled some of the MPs’ suggestions.89 In relation to the 
duration of stay of seasonal workers, the Commission underlined that 
the six-month period was agreed after careful consideration of possible 
87  See Parliament of Spain, Cortes Generales <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_gener-
al/relations/relations_other/npo/docs/spain/2010/com20100379/com20100379_both_
opinion_es.pdf> accessed 5 March 2012.
88  See Parliament of Italy, the Chamber of Deputies <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_
general/relations/relations_other/npo/docs/italy/2010/com20100379/com20100379_
deputati_opinion_en.pdf> accessed 8 March 2012.
89  See European Commission <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/re-
lations_other/npo/docs/italy/2010/com20100379/com20100379_deputati_reply_en.pdf> 
accessed 8 March 2012.
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options and national legislative solutions. This maximum period was 
chosen with a view to balancing the goal of enabling employers to access 
the needed workforce with that of ensuring that year-long jobs are not 
ﬁ lled with third-country seasonal workers. Concerning the sanctioning 
of employers, the Commission explained that the concretisation thereof 
was left to the Member States in the spirit of subsidiarity. This exchange 
of views was followed by another discussion round between the Chamber 
and the Commission.
For its part, the Italian Senato della Repubblica - through the opin-
ions of the Committee for European Union Policies, the Committee on 
Labour and Social Security and the Committee for Foreign Affairs and 
Emigration - expressed the view that, despite detailed regulation, the 
Proposal conformed to the principles of both subsidiarity and propor-
tionality.90 Two further points were highlighted by all three committees: 
(a) the 30-day deadline for processing applications for seasonal work per-
mits might be burdensome for Italian administration to adapt to; and (b) 
the maximum period of stay of six months might not meet the needs of 
the Italian agricultural sector. To these senators’ concerns, the Commis-
sion responded with the same comments as those given to the German 
Bundesrat on the time permitted to process applications for seasonal 
work permits and those given to the Chamber of Deputies on the dura-
tion of stay of seasonal workers.91
E) The Netherlands
On 14 October 2010, the Dutch Parliament, Staten-Generaal, in-
formed the Commission of the ‘subsidiarity test’ it had carried out re-
garding this Proposal. By means of a joint opinion, both chambers, the 
Tweede Kamer (Lower House) and the Eerste Kamer (Upper House), found 
that the principles of both subsidiarity and proportionality had been in-
fringed.92 The Dutch MPs and senators disagreed with the Commission’s 
appraisal that the demand for seasonal workers is at a similar level in 
the Member States. In their view, the Commission’s stance was based on 
unclear ﬁ gures. Instead, large variations existed in the national labour 
markets regarding job seekers. Since the Commission failed to demon-
90  See Parliament of Italy, the Senate <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/re-
lations/relations_other/npo/docs/italy/2010/com20100379/com20100379_senato_opin-
ion_en.pdf> accessed 8 March 2012.
91  See European Commission <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/re-
lations_other/npo/docs/italy/2010/com20100379/com20100379_senato_reply_en.pdf> 
accessed 8 March 2012.
92  See Parliament of the Netherlands, the House of Representatives and the Senate 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/docs/nether-
lands/2010/com20100379/com20100379_both_opinion_en.pdf> accessed 9 March 2012.
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strate that differences between the Member States and regions are due 
to different legislative approaches, there was no clear need for the Pro-
posal. Furthermore, the two parliamentary chambers underscored that 
the problem of seasonal workers overstaying their work permits could be 
better tackled by enhancing the capacity of and collaboration between 
national supervisory and inspection organisations than by harmonis-
ing laws and regulations. The Dutch parliamentarians thus assessed 
that national socio-economic laws, together with European and global 
agreements, sufﬁ ciently safeguard the rights of third-country nationals 
on the EU territory. In addition, the Proposal adds no value in relation 
to the conclusion of joint agreements with countries of origin regard-
ing seasonal employment, which could represent a way to combat illegal 
immigration. The Proposal also does not increase the effectiveness of 
the ﬁ ght against illegal employment, because it does not require sepa-
rate work permits for seasonal work shorter than three months. Another 
contested point was the six-month period as the maximum duration of 
seasonal employment, which the MPs and senators deemed too long and 
conducive to abuses of national social security systems. As was the case 
with the Czech Parliament, the Commission replied with an overview of 
its reactions to national parliamentary opinions.93 Among them was a 
response that harmonised rules on migration not only facilitate the EU’s 
cooperation with third countries but also potentially have a signiﬁ cant 
impact on its development policy. The concept of circular migration can 
actually produce ‘triple win’ outcomes insofar as the country of desti-
nation can meet its workforce needs, seasonal workers bring expertise, 
knowledge and money back to their country of origin, which in turn is 
beneﬁ cial for the latter country. The Commission also stressed that the 
Proposal does not ban the Member States from requiring work permits 
for stays shorter than three months but only that it requires such per-
mits to be issued for stays exceeding this period. The reply concerning 
varying domestic labour market conditions was identical to that given 
to Czech senators, whereas the reply concerning the duration of stay of 
seasonal workers was identical to that given to Italian MPs.
The foregoing examination of the practical participation of national 
MPs and senators in the Barroso Initiative allows several observations 
to be made. First, a general remark is that upper chambers appear more 
proactive and eager to engage in policy discussions with the Commis-
sion. This can be explained by the speciﬁ c constitutional position of 
these chambers as ‘chambers of reﬂ ection’ rather than as ‘chambers of 
decision’. The accountability link with the national government is mostly 
93  See European Commission <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/
relations_other/npo/docs/netherlands/2010/com20100379/com20100379_both_reply_
en.pdf> accessed 9 March 2012.
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looser with upper chambers than with lower chambers, which affords 
the former greater leeway to delve more deeply into the political dialogue 
with EU institutions. Second, the approach to responding to the Com-
mission’s proposals is by no means uniform. While some parliamentary 
chambers gauge compliance with both subsidiarity and proportionality 
(eg the Dutch Staten Generaal, the Spanish Cortes Generales and the 
Italian Senato della Repubblica), others also assess the legal basis (eg 
the Spanish Cortes Generales) or focus on the substance of the proposal 
exclusively (eg the German Bundesrat) or predominantly (eg the Czech 
Senate). Third, the analysis shows that substantive elements of EU pro-
posals are of greater legal and political signiﬁ cance to national parlia-
mentarians than isolated subsidiarity veriﬁ cations. In this respect, par-
liaments keenly suggest amendments to draft EU legislation, some of 
which are aimed at shielding national law (eg the Italian Parliament) 
and some also at safeguarding the coherence of EU law (eg the Ger-
man Bundesrat). The Barroso Initiative therefore offers an opportunity 
for national parliaments to voice the speciﬁ cities ﬂ owing from their ju-
ridico-political settings and thus raise awareness within the Commis-
sion of the needs, preferences and interests of their Member States. The 
Commission’s replies are succinct, if not brief. Nevertheless, they seem to 
reﬂ ect the Commission’s self-imposed commitment to heed national par-
liamentary concerns and recommendations and justify EU policies from 
the point of view of particular Member States. This may both appease 
potential political ‘unrest’ or scepticism in the domestic legislatures but 
it may also corroborate the legitimacy of EU policy making. In contrast, 
where the Commission evades replying to certain preoccupations ad-
duced by one or more national parliaments, this could be taken as a 
delegitimising factor.
7.3. Early warning mechanism: policing subsidiarity
7.3.1. Origin and functioning of the early warning mechanism
Once envisaged in the failed Constitutional Treaty,94 the Lisbon 
Treaty’s Subsidiarity Protocol enshrined a revised version of the early 
warning mechanism as one of the most important European tasks of 
94  NW Barber, ‘Subsidiarity in the Draft Constitution’ (2005) 11(2) European Public Law 
197; Pierre-Alexis Feral, ‘Retour en force du principe de subsidiarité dans le Traité consti-
tutionnel: de nouvelles responsabilités pour les parlements nationaux et pour le Comité 
des régions?’ (2004) 481 Revue du Marché Commun et de l’Union Européenne 496; Vlad 
Constantinesco,‘Les compétences et le principe de subsidiarité’ (2005) 41(2) Revue Trimes-
trielle de Droit Européen 305; Anna Vergés Bausili,‘Beyond the Early Warning Mechanism: 
The Reform of EU Governance and National Parliaments’ in Ingolf Pernice and Jirí Zemanék 
(eds), A Constitution for Europe: The IGC, the Ratiﬁ cation Process and Beyond (Nomos Ver-
lagsgesellschaft 2005).
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national parliaments.95 This mechanism charges national parliaments 
with monitoring the compliance of draft EU legislative acts with the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity in the ﬁ eld of shared competences. Subsidiarity su-
pervision therefore does not address the question of whether the Union 
acts ultra vires,96 but whether it should use the competence it possesses. 
Yet it is indeed plausible that in assessing whether subsidiarity has been 
respected, national parliaments need to take into account the broader 
context of a given draft EU act. 
The early warning mechanism functions as follows.97 Within eight 
weeks, national parliaments may submit reasoned opinions to the pres-
idents of the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council 
on subsidiarity compliance. The opinions count as votes. Each Member 
State has two votes, which in non-unicameral systems are apportioned 
to the houses of parliament or regional assemblies according to nation-
al constitutional rules.98 There are three stages, which differ as to the 
threshold of votes and as to the consequence that these trigger.
Stage 1. If the reasoned opinions sent amount to less than a third of 
the votes allocated to national parliaments, they need to be taken into 
95  Protocol no 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality. See 
various analyses: Robert Schütze, ‘Subsidiarity After Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of 
Federalism?’ (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 525; Alexandre Met-Domestici, ‘Les parle-
ments nationaux et le contrôle du respect du principe de subsidiarité’ (2009) 525 Revue 
du Marché Commun et de l’Union Européenne 88; René Barents, ‘Het subsidiariteitsbegin-
sel in het Hervormingsverdrag’ (2007) 11 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 253; 
George Bermann, ‘The Lisbon Treaty: The Irish “No”. National Parliaments and Subsidiar-
ity: An Outsider’s View’ (2008) 4 European Constitutional Law Review 453; Ian Cooper, 
‘The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing in the EU’ 
(2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 281; Tapio Raunio, ‘Destined for Irrelevance? 
Subsidiarity Control by National Parliaments’ (2010) Elcano Royal Institute, Working Paper 
No 36/2010; Kiiver, (n 74) 77; Philipp Kiiver, The Early Warning System for the Principle of 
Subsidiarity: Constitutional Theory and Empirical Reality (Routledge 2012).
96  See contra the view that ‘compliance with the principle of subsidiarity is not merely a 
question of how desirable a certain piece of EU legislation is or would be. What is at stake 
is the question whether the European Union may (lawfully) legislate at all’. Philipp Kiiver, 
‘The Early-Warning System for the Principle of Subsidiarity: The National Parliament as a 
Conseil d’État for Europe’ (2011) 36 EL Rev 104. This interpretation is questionable, be-
cause the Union indeed possesses the competence to legislate, but since that competence 
is shared with the Member States, an assessment, inherently of a political nature, must be 
made concerning the desirable level at which action should be taken.
97  Article 7 of the Subsidiarity Protocol.
98  This means that unicameral parliaments have two votes. The houses of a bicameral 
parliament have one vote each. In systems with more than two assemblies, the two votes 
pertaining to that Member State are allocated in accordance with national constitutional 
law. For example, Declaration no 51 by the Kingdom of Belgium on national parliaments 
attached to the Treaty of Lisbon clariﬁ es that ‘not only the Chamber of Representatives and 
Senate of the Federal Parliament but also the parliamentary assemblies of the Communities 
and the Regions act, in terms of the competences exercised by the Union, as components of 
the national parliamentary system or chambers of the national parliament’.
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account by the Commission or another institution that initiated a given 
draft EU act.
Stage 2 (yellow card). If the reasoned opinions amount to at least 
a quarter of the votes in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, or at 
least a third in all other ﬁ elds, the Commission must review the draft, 
whereupon it may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw it. Whatever 
its decision, the Commission must provide reasons for this.
Stage 3 (orange card). If, in the ordinary legislative procedure, the 
reasoned opinions amount to a simple majority of the votes allocated, the 
draft proposal, as in the second stage, must be reviewed, after which the 
Commission may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw it. If the Com-
mission decides to proceed, it must justify in its own reasoned opinion 
why it considers that the draft is in conformity with subsidiarity. The 
Commission must then, unlike in the second stage, send the national 
parliaments’ reasoned opinions, together with its own, to the Union leg-
islature (the Council and the European Parliament) for a ﬁ nal decision. 
This decision must be taken before the end of the ﬁ rst reading. The draft 
falls if at least a majority of 55% of the Council members or a majority of 
the votes cast in the European Parliament decide that the proposal con-
travenes subsidiarity. This stage of the early warning procedure did not 
exist in the Constitutional Treaty, but was added by the Lisbon Treaty.99 
The high threshold for the rejection of the proposal has rightly been criti-
cised, because if the European Parliament and the Council can muster 
such massive opposition, the proposal would be rejected anyway during 
the ordinary legislative procedure, thereby rendering an ‘early warning’ 
superﬂ uous.100
One ought to distinguish between the so-called ‘early warning 
mechanism’ and the Barroso Initiative.101 Unlike the Barroso Initiative, 
the early warning mechanism is foreseen in the Treaties and as such 
can produce legally binding consequences for EU institutions and can 
99  See further in: Olaf Tans, ‘De oranje kaart: een nieuwe rol voor nationale parlementen?’ 
(2007) 11 SEW - Tijdschrift voor Europees en economisch recht 442; Stefanie Rothenberger 
and Oliver Vogt, ‘The “Orange Card”: A Fitting Response to National Parliaments’ Marginali-
sation in EU Decision-making?’ Paper prepared for the conference ‘Fifty Years of Interpar-
liamentary Cooperation’ (Berlin, 13 June 2007). A number of authors indeed fear that the 
right of veto in the hands of national parliaments would distort the distribution of power in 
the EU’s system of governance and that it would concede too much to national interests. 
See Stephen Weatherill, ‘Using National Parliaments to Improve Scrutiny of the Limits of EU 
Action’ (2003) 28 EL Rev 912; Muriel Le Barbier-Le Bris, ‘Le nouveau rôle des parlements 
nationaux: avancée démocratique ou sursaut étatiste?’ (2008) 521 Revue du Marché Com-
mun et de l’Union européenne 497.
100  See Article 294 TFEU (former Article 251 TEC) for the voting thresholds in the ordinary 
legislative procedure. See also Kiiver (n 74) 81.
101  See more in JanËiÊ (n 75) 82.
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be abolished only by an amendment of the Treaties. Therefore, the ef-
fects of the early warning mechanism are determined by the Treaties 
and the success of the mechanism does not depend, as is the case with 
the Barroso Initiative, on the willingness of the Commission. Further-
more, the early warning mechanism is restricted to the monitoring of the 
principle of subsidiarity, whereas the Barroso Initiative provides much 
ampler room for political assessment of EU policies. In practice, the dif-
ference between the two systems lies in the fact that, due to the difﬁ -
culty of reaching the aforesaid thresholds, the Commission will seldom 
be forced to react to parliamentary opinions in the context of the early 
warning mechanism, but it will do so in the context of the Barroso Ini-
tiative because it has politically undertaken to do so. Besides, national 
parliaments are more interested in providing feedback on the substance 
of proposals rather than on matters that are purely related to subsidiar-
ity.102 Finally, the Commission publishes separate reports for the Bar-
roso Initiative and for the early warning mechanism.
7.3.2. The early warning mechanism in practice
For the ﬁ rst time after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
national parliaments reached the ‘yellow card’ threshold regarding the 
so-called Monti II Regulation, ie the Proposal for a Council Regulation on 
the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services.103 A total 
of 19 votes, one above the threshold, coming from the parliamentary 
chambers of 12 Member States - namely Belgium, Denmark, France, Fin-
land, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands - found a subsidiarity violation.104 The 
Commission is now obliged to review its Proposal and decide whether to 
maintain, amend or withdraw it. In any case, it must justify its decision. 
As examples, we examine below the reasoned opinions of the parlia-
ments of Belgium, France, Denmark and Malta to take into account the 
102  European Commission, Annual report 2010 on relations between the European Com-
mission and national parliaments COM (2011) 345, 10 June 2011, 5.
103  European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to 
take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services COM (2012) 130 of 21 March 2012. See comments on it in Niklas Bruun 
and Andreas Bücker, ‘Critical Assessment of the Proposed Monti II Regulation - More Cour-
age and Strength Needed to Remedy the Social Imbalances’ (2012) ETUI Policy Brief no 
4/2012.
104  For more information, see IPEX <http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/document/
COM20120130.do> accessed 3 September 2012. Parliaments sometimes also send positive 
reasoned opinions that conclude in favour of subsidiarity compliance. This was the case, for 
example, with the Italian Senato della Repubblica.
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geographical representation of the Member States as well as their size 
and date of accession.
A) Belgium
By means of the opinion that the Social Affairs Committee adopted 
on 22 May 2012, the Belgian House of Representatives found a subsid-
iarity breach and thus ﬁ led one vote against the Monti II Regulation.105 
The breach was based on several grounds. First, the MPs found that the 
Commission could not use the so-called ﬂ exibility clause laid down in 
Article 352 TFEU as the legal basis for this Proposal.106 Second, in their 
view, the right to work remains a national matter par excellence, even 
though they agree that the EU may play a complementing or supporting 
role in this ﬁ eld. Third, they objected to the fact that the draft Regulation 
foresees the possibility of restricting the right to collective action, as it 
goes beyond what is authorised by the European Social Charter, which is 
a treaty guaranteeing social and economic human rights that was con-
cluded in 1961 under the auspices of the Council of Europe.
B) France
On the same day as the Belgian House of Representatives, the 
French Sénat adopted a European resolution on the Monti II Regula-
tion.107 The principle of subsidiarity was found violated for several rea-
sons. First, the legal basis was judged inadequate. The Commission had 
failed to draw the attention of national parliaments to the fact that this 
Proposal was initiated by recourse to Article 352 TFEU, which is an ex-
press duty of the Commission under this Treaty.108 In addition, the same 
Article prohibits the harmonisation of national laws or regulations where 
105  See Parliament of Belgium, the House of Representatives <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/docs/belgium/2012/com20120130/
com20120130_representants_opinion_fr.pdf> accessed 4 September 2012.
106  Article 352(1) TFEU empowers the Council of Ministers, acting unanimously on a pro-
posal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, to 
adopt the appropriate measures if action by the Union should prove necessary to attain one 
of the objectives set out in the Treaties and the Treaties have not provided the necessary 
powers for it.
107  See Parliament of France, the Senate <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/
relations/relations_other/npo/docs/france/2012/com20120130/com20120130_senat_
opinion_fr.pdf> accessed 4 September 2012; See also Sénat, Résolution européenne no 
119 portant avis motivé sur la conformité au principe de subsidiarité de la proposition de 
réglement du Conseil relatif à l’exercice du droit de mener des actions collectives of 22 May 
2012.
108  Article 352(2) TFEU.
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the Treaties exclude such harmonisation.109 In this respect, the senators 
emphasised that the TFEU indeed expressly excludes the possibility of 
the Union adopting complementing or supporting measures concerning 
the right to strike, let alone measures leading to the legal harmonisation 
of this right.110 Second, the Proposal was assessed to exceed the com-
petence of the Union for limiting the exercise of the right to strike. How-
ever, the senators offered a wording that would respect the principle of 
subsidiarity. This wording would omit the clause by which ‘the exercise 
of the fundamental right to take collective action, including the right or 
freedom to strike, shall respect these economic freedoms’.
C) Denmark
The European Affairs Committee of the Danish Folketing adopted a 
reasoned opinion against the Monti II Regulation on 3 May 2012.111 The 
MPs found that this Proposal infringes the subsidiarity principle because 
it risks disturbing the already well-functioning domestic arrangements 
in the ﬁ eld of labour law without adding clarity either to the freedom of 
movement or the right of workers to take collective action. They also saw 
no need for the Union to intervene in the existing national mechanisms 
for dispute settlement. Neither did they think that there was any rea-
son for the EU to establish a duty for the Member States to inform the 
Commission and the other relevant Member States of potential labour 
disputes. Just as the French Sénat had done, the Danish Parliament 
invoked the fact the TFEU explicitly excludes the right to strike from the 
matters in which the EU may act.
D) Malta
In its exceptionally well-argued reasoned opinion of 22 May 2012, 
the 69-strong Maltese House of Representatives, Kamra tad-Deputati, re-
jected the Monti II Regulation on several grounds.112 In doing so, the 
MPs carried out a detailed appraisal not only of the very text of the 
Proposal but also of the Preamble and the impact assessment. Besides 
questioning the legal basis, the Maltese parliamentarians challenged the 
Regulation’s purported objective of clarifying the exercise of the right to 
take collective action in the context of economic freedoms in light of the 
109  Article 352(3) TFEU.
110  Article 153(5) TFEU.
111  See Parliament of Denmark <http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/ﬁ les/download/
082dbcc536f2cbce01371331bf7b0e14.do> accessed 4 September 2012.
112  See Parliament of Malta <http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/ﬁ les/download/
082dbcc537165b8801377507a7c733a5.do> accessed 4 September 2012.
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Viking and Laval judgments of the Court of Justice, holding that these 
judicial decisions are already very clear so that the Regulation does not 
add any value. They also disagreed with the choice of the legal instru-
ment, stressing that a Regulation would only have been justiﬁ ed if there 
had been an urgent necessity for an immediate clariﬁ cation of the stan-
dards used by the Luxembourg Court and if such a Regulation indeed 
provided such clarity, none of which was the case with this Proposal. 
Of real concern to the MPs was the Commission’s intention to ‘prevent 
solutions being unilaterally sought at national level’. In their view, the 
Regulation would cause ‘disproportionate detriment to proper analysis 
by national authorities’ of whether imperative reasons of public interest 
necessarily, reasonably and proportionately require a restriction on the 
exercise of the right to take collective action or on the exercise of eco-
nomic freedoms. In addition, the alert mechanism envisaged by the Pro-
posal contains a whole array of vague legal standards that are open to 
wide interpretation. The Regulation thus introduces ‘outside involvement 
of highly undetermined, unclear and indeterminable purpose, operation 
and effect, and capable of seriously affecting the application of the rel-
evant tests’. For these chief reasons, the Maltese Parliament concluded 
that the Commission’s Proposal failed the tests of necessity, appropriate-
ness (or suitability) and proportionality.
This early warning episode is remarkable both as regards its epi-
logue and as regards the reasoning that the Commission gave for it. On 
12 September 2012, the Commission decided to withdraw its Proposal. 
This was done in the form of an announcement that the Employment 
Commissioner, László Andor, made to the members of the Employment 
Committee of the European Parliament. However, the Commission’s 
Spokesman for employment and social affairs, Jonathan Todd, intimated 
that a legal assessment of the national parliaments’ reasoned opinions 
‘did not lead to the conclusion that the principle of subsidiarity has been 
breached’. Instead, he added, the Commission abandoned the Monti II 
Regulation because it was ‘unlikely to gather the necessary political sup-
port for its adoption’.113 Therefore, even though the Commission’s reason-
ing prima facie appears deﬁ ant of the national parliaments’ collective 
subsidiarity appraisal, the mere political force of their opposition did 
play a factor in halting the Proposal. It is important to underline that 
the Commission could have proceeded with the Proposal despite the ob-
jections of national parliamentarians, but it chose not to. As such, the 
‘yellow card’ issued within the framework of the ﬂ edgling early warning 
113  EurActiv, ‘Brussels Drops Plans for EU Law Limiting Right to Strike’, 14 September 2012
<http://www.euractiv.com/socialeurope/ec-drops-regulation-right-strike-news-514793> 
accessed 20 September 2012.
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mechanism thus proved capable of bringing inﬂ uence to bear on the 
Commission’s use of its legislative initiative.
8.  Conclusion: cross-level interaction and parliamentary 
representation
The analysis carried out in this article conﬁ rms the hypothesis that 
national parliamentary scrutiny of EU matters is not necessarily an iso-
lated domestic process, concentrated merely on control over the activities 
of governments at the EU level. In certain respects, and as documented 
particularly by the Barroso Initiative and the early warning mechanism, 
the scrutiny of EU policies conducted at the national level aims to in-
ﬂ uence, or at least contribute to, interinstitutional developments in the 
process of crafting legislation of the European Union. In this sense, the 
Lisbon Treaty’s expectation for national parliaments to contribute ac-
tively to the good functioning of the Union is beginning to be fulﬁ lled. 
While national parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs is motivated 
by domestic legal, constitutional and political circumstances, it can be 
argued that national MPs and senators embrace new avenues of cross-
level communication on EU policies, mostly in order to safeguard the 
interests of their own Member States and the constituencies where they 
were elected. This is evidenced by the Barroso Initiative, as the cases 
studied reveal the parliamentarians’ focus on the repercussions of draft 
EU initiatives for the domestic legal framework. The examples from the 
practice of the early warning mechanism also testify to the fact that 
national MPs and senators do not refrain from giving thorough consider-
ation to the contents and merits of draft EU legislation, sometimes sug-
gesting alternative legal solutions. However, as demonstrated by COSAC 
subsidiarity checks, many obstacles stand in the way of more efﬁ cient 
national parliamentary participation in EU decision-making processes. 
Even so, parliaments effectively use the instruments envisaged under 
national law, such as resolutions and reports, to make their voices heard 
among EU institutions. 
National parliaments should therefore be considered to underpin, 
albeit modestly, the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s ex ante policy-
making processes. Cooperation within COSAC, the Barroso Initiative, 
the early warning mechanism and various interparliamentary forums 
furnish valuable opportunities for national politicians to have a say in 
making the Union more accountable to its citizens, not least by prompt-
ing EU institutions to explain and justify the policy choices made. Per-
tinent questions remain open, however. There is no reliable toolkit to 
measure the inﬂ uence of the pronouncements of national parliaments in 
EU matters or the degree of the contribution of such activities to a more 
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effective implementation of EU acts in national legal orders. The partici-
patory efforts of national parliaments may nevertheless raise awareness 
among elected representatives of the high degree of interlacement be-
tween the EU and the Member States in both legal and political spheres. 
For example, a very proactive approach of the Portuguese Assembly to 
the scrutiny of the Commission’s initiatives within the Barroso Initia-
tive has led to an incremental entrenchment of the hitherto non-existent 
culture of oversight over EU decision making.114 Another example of a 
potential catalyst effect on national parliamentary scrutiny of EU poli-
cies is the sharp analysis of the Commission’s legislative initiative by the 
Maltese Parliament, the EU’s third smallest national parliament after 
those of Cyprus and Luxembourg. Since reasoned opinions are often 
shared across national parliaments in an informal manner and through 
the IPEX network, the arguments provided by the Maltese parliamentar-
ians might inspire similar assessments in other Member States and thus 
create a wave of reactions in domestic legislatures.
The role of national parliaments in the European constitutional or-
der has most recently been affected by the current euro crisis. The poly-
centric nature of this order is countenanced inasmuch as domestic par-
liamentary mechanisms now more than ever form part of it. It remains to 
be seen, however, what repercussions the ongoing push towards greater 
ﬁ scal and ﬁ nancial integration will have on the relations between the 
Union and its Member States as well as between their respective institu-
tions. In any event, the considerations presented in this article permit 
one to conclude that the development of a system of representative de-
mocracy that spreads across levels of governance is becoming an impor-
tant ingredient of EU democracy.
114  Davor JanËiÊ, ‘The Portuguese Parliament: Blazing the Trail to the European Scrutiny 
Trophy?’ (2011) 1 Interdisciplinary Political Studies 104.

